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The Romanian Constitutional Court has backstabbed the
Romanian President in his efforts to protect the
independence of the chief anti-corruption prosecutor. On 30
May 2018, the Constitutional Court ordered the President to
dismiss the chief anti-corruption prosecutor via presidential
decree. Before, the President had refused the proposed
dismissal by the Minister of Justice based on an Advisory
Opinion of the Superior Council of Magistracy that stated
that the reasons brought forward against the chief prosecutor
were not substantiated enough to justify a dismissal.
The forced dismissal of the chief anti-corruption prosecutor is just the latest act in an
ongoing drama within the fight against corruption in Romania. Last year, the government
proposed changes the legislation on corruption and judicial independence that were heavily
criticised by the European Commission, the Council of Europe and civil society. Now, the
chief prosecutor of the anti-corruption directorate is personally in the cross-hairs, and with
her the President that has been an outspoken critic of the Government’s reforms.
The chief prosecutor of the anti-corruption directorate, Laura-Codruța Kövesi, was
repeatedly attacked by the media and had faced institutional pressure before. So filed the
Minister of Justice, – a politically appointed member of Government – a complaint before
the Judicial Inspection[1], then the same Minister filed a complaint regarding a “legal
conflict of a constitutional nature” at the Constitutional Court for the failure of Ms. Kovesi to
testify in person before a special parliamentary committee investigating a political situation.
Because the issue under investigation was of political nature and because, according to an
older decision of the Constitutional Court[2] she could not be compelled to testify in person
before such a committee, the chief-prosecutor gave only a a written statement on the
matter. Political investigations forcing members of the judiciary to testify could be
interpreted as a form of pressure against their independence and impartiality. This time,
however, the Constitutional Court sided with the Minister and acknowledged a conflict with
her responsibilities.
In 2003, the Romanian Constitutional Court was given, by way of constitutional
amendment, the power to “resolve legal conflicts of a constitutional nature between
authorities”.[3] This power was intended to consolidate the constitutional democracy, by
ensuring that an independent referee – the Court – corrects the potential abuses of power
of one political or constitutional authority against another. In reality, the Constitutional Court
did not manage to build a coherent body of jurisprudence emerged from this power and,
moreover, especially in the last two years, transformed it into a political tool in favour of the
Government party against its opponents – the President and the judiciary.
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Over the years, the Court gave relatively few decisions on such conflict resolution
(aproximately two dozens) and it had an oscillating position including as regards its own
constitutional role in the matter. From the outset, in its early case law on this power, the
Court defined the rather loose constitutional expression `legal conflict of a constitutional
nature` as including “acts or concrete measures by which one or more authorities arrogate
powers that, according to the Constitution, belong to other public authorities, or the
omission of certain authorities to fulfill their obligations”[4]. The Court extended its power to
a maximum and made it clear that she will not consider ‘only’ the conflicts of competence,
but “any legal conflict of a constitutional nature created between public authorities”[5], but
also defined the nature of such conflicts as “directly residing in the constitutional text”.[6]
This extremely extensive power is made possible by the Constitution itself, which does not
restrict the Court to solving only conflicts of competence, unlike the majority of European
countries that give this power to their constitutional jurisdiction (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria,
Belgium, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain etc.).
The conflicts that the Court was called to solved were diverse and all authorities designed
by the Constitution with locus standi on the matter exercised this right: the President of
Romania, the Government, the Presidents of Chambers of the Parliament and the Superior
Council of Magistracy.[7] However, although clearly establishing an extended competence
over any conflicts residing in the constitutional text – be they of competence or not – the
Court has not defined its own role in the action of “resolving” these conflicts. Therefore, an
oscillating case law emerged – from situations in which the Court acknowledged the
existence of a conflict but did not give any solution to the authorities involved[8], to
decisions in which the Court indicated a general measure to be taken – with the concrete
measure to be decided by the given authority (e.g. to issue a legal act, but without
indicating the actual contents of that act[9]), and finally, to the most recent decision (the
motivation is still unpublished, therefore the comments are based only on the public press
release that quotes partially the ruling), in which the Court actually ordered the President of
Romania to issue a decree (which he is not constitutionally obliged to do) on a particular
matter involving the judiciary – i.e. a decree dismissing the chief-prosecutor of the anti-
corruption office. This last decision is the main object of my analysis, but, in the absence of
the complete Court’s reasoning, I will only emphasize some major faults of the Court’s
ruling, in the context of the latest political events in Romania.
On 23 February 2018, in a widely announced and broadcast press conference, the Minister
of Justice proposed to dismiss the chief-prosecutor by virtue of his ‘authority’ on the
prosecutors granted by Article 132 of the Constitution. Thus, the Law on judicial
organisation, in Article 51, allows the Minister of Justice to propose the dismissal of chief
prosecutors. The proposal is then sent to the Superior Council of Magistracy for an
Advisory Opinion and the final decision, according to the same law, belongs to the
President of Romania (the President is also the decision-making authority in the process of
appointing the chief-prosecutors, in a symmetric procedure).
In the present case, the Minister of Justice’s proposal was referred to the Superior Council
of Magistracy and, in an unusual way for this institution, the hearings on the proposal were
broadcasted live on TV and social media, on 27 February 2018. The Council’s opinion,
released a few weeks later, argued that the reasons on which the Minister of Justice based
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his proposal did not amount to deficiencies in the chief-prosecutor’s activity and therefore
advised against dismissal. On April 16 , the President of Romania announced that,
following all these developments, he will not decide the dismissal of Ms. Kövesi as a chief-
prosecutor of the DNA. The President based his decision mainly on the Superior Council of
Magistracy’s negative Advisory Opinion and on allegedly misinterpreted legal documents
included in the minister’s report. Following the President’s answer, the Minister of Justice
filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, on an alleged “legal conflict of a
constitutional nature” arisen from this situation. On 10 May, the hearings took place and on
30 May the decision was given by the Constitutional Court. Until the publication of the
decision, we can only comment on an excerpt made public via the press release and in
which the Court, besides acknowledging the existence of a conflict, actually ordered the
President of Romania “to issue the decree of revocation of Ms. Laura-Codruța Kövesi from
the position of chief-prosecutor of the national anti-corruption directorate”.
The outcome of the case, as it appears from this unprecedented ruling, is flawed from two
points of view: firstly, there is no actual constitutional conflict within the meaning of the
Constitution and the Court’s past case law; secondly, the Court has no competence to
dictate the contents of a presidential decree (or of any constitutional authority, including
within its constitutional review powers).
The existence of a constitutional conflict is the first problematic issue of the Court’s
decision. The alleged conflict would have arisen between the President and the
Government (the Government being the actual author of the complaint). However, on the
one hand, the Government as an institution has no constitutional powers regarding the
appointment or dismissal of chief-prosecutors. The Minister of Justice’s attribution to
propose the dismissal is established by a law and not by the Constitution. On the other
hand, the President’s power to decide on the dismissal is also established by the law on
the organisation of the judiciary and is designed as a part of the checks-and-balances
against potential abuses of power from the executive against the judiciary. In the present
case, both authorities (Minister of Justice and President) have exercised their legal
competences and therefore no constitutional conflict of competences should have been
pronounced.
As to the contents of the Court’s ruling, the analogy with the constitutional review powers of
the Court is relevant. Thus, according to the Court’s own organic law on organisation and
functioning (Article 2 §3), “the Constitutional Court decides only as regards the
constitutionality of acts on which it has been seized and cannot change or complete the
controlled dispositions”. A fortiori, the Court should have no power to impose a certain
content of an act of a political authority. If the Court cannot oblige the Parliament to adopt a
certain legal text, she cannot dictate the President to issue a decree with a certain content,
as both are elected authorities with high democratic legitimacy.
I also have to point out that, by this highly controversial decision, the Constitutional Courts
contradicts its own case law regarding the presidential powers in relation with the judiciary.
Thus, in 2005, the Court firmly stated that “if the President of Romania had no right to
examine and appreciate on the proposals made by the Superior Council of Magistracy for
the appointment of judges and prosecutors in leading positions or if he/she had no right to
refuse, by motivated decision and at least only once, such appointments, the role of the
th
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President according to Articles 94 §c and 125 §1 of the Constitution would be devoid of
contents and importance”. This is all the more true, I would add, when the dismissal
proposal comes from a minister and the Superior Council of Magistracy advises against it.
The present decision means, besides devoiding of contents and importance the role of the
President, the total overlooking of the role of the Superior Council of Magistracy in a case
that is strictly related to the judiciary’s internal matters.
To conclude, this ruling of the Romanian Constitutional Court proves, firstly, how easily a
Constitutional Court majority (6 to 3 in the present case) can be used as a tool by the
political power, by disregarding its own case law and the basic principles of constitutional
review in the wider meaning. Secondly, this ruling aims at the heart of the Romanian
constitutional system as a whole, by transforming it from a semi-presidential one (a directly
elected President with more limited powers than in a presidential system) into a hybrid
parliamentary one (a directly elected President with a merely formal role). The potential
precedent created by such a decision would mean the devoiding of contents of all powers
of the President by future similar decisions, should the President be in conflict with the
political majority that controls the Court. This type of political involvement is unacceptable
for a Constitutional Court that is considered the guardian of the Constitution and the
enforcer of the rule of law in a constitutional democracy.
[1] The Judicial Inspection (hereinafter JI), an internal structure of the Superior Council of
Magistracy (see footnote 8) is empowered with bringing and/or investigating the disciplinary
actions and sanctions against magistrates. The final decisions on such actions belongs to
the Council.
[2] RCC, Decision no. 80/2014 which said that “establishing the obligation for public law
persons, other than those provided by Article 111 of the Constitution [i.e. the Government
and the public administration], of legal and natural persons to be present before
parliamentary committees goes against the role and purpose of these committees and,
impliedly, against the constitutional role of the Parliament and of the constitutional principle
of the separation and balance of powers”.
[3] For more details, see Bianca Selejan-Guțan, The Constitution of Romania. A Contextual
Analysis, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 179.
[4] RCC, Decision no. 53/2005
[5] RCC, Decision no. 270/2008
[6] RCC, Decision no. 901/2009
[7] The Superior Council of Magistracy is the judicial self-government body, established by
the Constitution, designed as the „guarantor of the independence of the judiciary” and with
a salient role as regards the magistrates’ (judges and prosecutors) career.
[8] RCC, Decision no. 1431/2010
[9] RCC, Decision no. 261/2015
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